Iran’s model of symmetric deterrence in an asymmetric war

Kayhan, in an article on Iran’s new deterrence model, wrote: “The common assumption is that Iran’s energy infrastructure is a vulnerability and an easy target in wartime.” However, Iran’s new deterrence strategy is built on the principle that any damage to these infrastructures will trigger a chain of reciprocal insecurity and infrastructural destruction.

Iran has managed to establish a balance of destruction, shifting the cost of any attack on its energy facilities beyond its borders and turning it into an existential crisis for the entire global capitalist system and industrial network. Based on this logic, any strike on Iran’s refineries or pipelines would immediately lead to widespread attacks on and destruction of oil and gas wells, pumping stations, and energy infrastructure belonging to Israel and US-aligned hostile states in the region. This approach confronts the United States with the reality that destroying Iran’s infrastructure would mean the collapse of the economies of its regional allies and, consequently, a crash in financial markets and industry in the US and Europe.

Iran: Riyadh’s changing perception of Tehran’s power

The Iran newspaper, in an interview with Hossein Ajorlou, a senior West Asia analyst, evaluated Saudi Arabia’s reported proposal for a non‑aggression pact with Iran. The publication of reports about Riyadh’s proposal has once again raised questions about the future of the security balance in West Asia. Riyadh is also concerned about the potential consequences of the current situation. It fears that Iran might escalate asymmetric actions, intensify attacks, or activate aligned regional actors. Also, a severely weakened Iran could create space for greater influence by actors such as Israel, Turkey, or other regional rivals—an outcome not necessarily in Saudi Arabia’s favor. Thus, it appears Riyadh seeks to prevent sharp and uncontrolled shifts in the regional balance. The main goal is to establish a regulatory mechanism in Iran–Saudi relations—one that contains tensions and provides Saudi Arabia with a minimum level of security.

Hamshahri: Washington’s political infighting over war with Iran

Hamshahri, in a commentary on a session originally intended to review the US defense budget for 2027, wrote: A meeting had been scheduled to examine the U.S. defense budget for 2027, but quickly turned into an unusually fierce confrontation over the prospect of war with Iran, revealing deep divisions in Washington over objectives, costs, and even the meaning of victory in such a conflict. The heated clash in Congress was not just another routine political dispute; it exposed a profound rift in Washington over the Iran issue—a rift rooted in the absence of a coherent strategy, ambiguity in objectives, and even a crisis in defining what victory would mean in this confrontation.

Etemad: Eastern supporters will not enter confrontation

Etemad, in an interview with Majid Mohammad‑Sharifi, an international affairs expert, examined Russia’s and China’s positions on Iran and the current conflict with the US and Israel. According to the expert, China and Russia want the region’s political situation to return to its pre‑war state, though their views on developments in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz differ due to divergent interests. Both countries will support the Islamic Republic of Iran and may provide some military or intelligence assistance, but such support will be limited and not “game‑changing. Given their other priorities—Taiwan and the trade war for China, and Ukraine for Russia—they do not wish to enter direct confrontation with the US over Iran. Therefore, the outcome of this standoff will largely depend on the military balance and the capabilities of the parties on the battlefield. Although some assistance has been provided and may continue, this does not amount to the formation of a solid, armed bloc.